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Union Security Under Federal Statutes
Part II
by George Maxwell*
T HE INTRODUCTION to this subject, in an article which appeared
in the Cleveland Marshall Law Review, Volume I, No. 1,
beginning on page 65, discussed some of the terminology of Union
Security as it relates to the question of compulsory membership
in a union. As the title to that article indicated, that sort of
union security is but a small portion of the field of union pro-
tection under Federal Statutes. It is proposed here to discuss
further the protection given to unions by Federal Statutes. Such
protection may be accorded by the Anti-trust Acts and the Anti-
injunction Act. The Labor-Management Relations Act and its
amended predecessor the Labor Relations Act and the security
they provide unions will be discussed in a later article. Im-
portant as is the language of these acts, it is also necessary to
follow the interpretation of that language by the Federal Courts.
I.
First let us consider the protection against actions under the
Anti-trust Acts.
The Sherman Anti-trust Act, enacted in July of 1890, holds
forth as its purpose "to protect trade and commerce against un-
lawful restraints and monopolies." This Act declares that every
"contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal
... )I I Certain provisos to the above Act permit a manufacturer
to control the resale price of his own goods subject to the con-
dition that there are other like goods for sale in competition
therewith. Section 8 of the Act states, "The word 'person,' or
'persons,' wherever used in this Act shall be deemed to include
corporations and associations existing under or authorized by
* Mr. Maxwell is the head of a firm of labor relation consultants with
offices in Cleveland and Detroit. He is a former member of both the War
Labor Board and the Wage Stabilization Board, and will receive his LL.B.
degree from Cleveland-Marshall Law School in June, 1953.
'26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1946).
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the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the terri-
tories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country." 2
This section left undetermined whether labor unions, which
might be classed as associations, could enter into agreements, or
conspiracies, to protect the sale price of the services of their
members. The matter was not long in coming to issue and de-
cision. In the case of U. S. v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Coun-
cil of New Orleans3 it was held that the Act did apply to the
activities of labor unions and that the strike, whose purpose was
to force a closed shop on all businesses in New Orleans, was an
interference with interstate and foreign commerce and was
therefore a violation of the Act. A case of more widespread
effect was that of Loewe v. Lawlor.4 In this case the complain-
ant, a hat-maker (Loewe), sued the United Hatters of North
America, alleging that the union had violated the Act in bring-
ing about a strike and a nationwide boycott of secondary nature.
The union had solicited the assistance of the American Federa-
tion of Labor in enforcing the secondary boycott to cause the
customers of the employer to cease doing business with him. In
this case the Supreme Court stated that the prohibitions of the
Act ran to all activities which interfered with the free flow of
commerce.
These two decisions considerably hampered unions in their
efforts to bring about the closed shop, the only type of "union
shop" known at that time.
In 1914, allegedly to alleviate the restraint which the Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act had placed upon labor's efforts to protect its
wages, the Clayton Anti-Trust Act was enacted. The portion
of the Act which concerns the problem under consideration is
that numbered Section 6 which says (inter alia):
"That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust
laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and opera-
tions of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organization, ...
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organiza-
tions, from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof,
be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspira-
cies in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust laws." 5
'Ibid.
'54 Fed. 994 (5th Cir. 1893).
'208 U. S. 274 (1908).
'38 Stat. 730 (1914), 29 U. S. C. § 52 (1946).
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Further, in Section 20, the Act provides:
"that no restraining order or injunctions shall be granted by
any court of the United States, or a judge or judges thereof,
in any case between an employer and employees, or between
employers and employees . . . involving, or growing out of,
a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment,
unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property,
or to a property right, of the party making the application,
for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, .. ."
"... and no such restraining order or injunction shall pro-
hibit any person or persons . .. from ceasing to perform
any work or labor, or from recommending, advising or per-
suading others by peaceful means so to do ... or from ceas-
ing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or
from recommending, advising or persuading others by peace-
ful and lawful means so to do; . . . or from doing any act
or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of
such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts
specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be
violations of any law of the United States." 6
In the case of Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering7 the Act was
first fully tested in this respect. In this case the company did
not employ union members. Certain unions, not representing
any of Duplex's employees, brought about a situation in which
employees of other companies refused to handle or install the
presses manufactured by Duplex. Indeed, the unions went so
far as to threaten customers of Duplex with strike action. In
sum, the unions created a secondary boycott. The Duplex Com-
pany sued the union alleging a conspiracy in restraint of trade
under the definitions of the Clayton Act. The union cited Sec-
tion 20 of the Act in its defense. The Supreme Court decided
against the union. The issue, as defined by the Court, was
whether Section 20 protected the type of activities in which the
union had engaged. The decision was based on the ground that
while the Act protected strikes, picketing and boycotts, it did
so only when such conduct was between "an employer and em-
ployees, or between employers and employees, or between per-
sons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or
growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of em-
ployment . . ." Because the issue here did not involve an em-
ployer-employee dispute, the court held against the unions and
granted the Duplex Company an injunction.
a Ibid.
1254 U. S. 443 (1921).
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This case provided a basis for the conclusion that the pro-
tection of the Clayton Act did not run to a union which engaged
in a secondary boycott resulting in an obstruction to interstate
commerce and the free flow thereof.
The question still remained whether a strike of any sort
was a violation of the Act. The Supreme Court in the two so-
called Coronado Cases" and in United Leather Workers v. Her-
kert & Meisel Trunk CoY carried the interpretation of the Act
a step farther. These cases should be noted in chronological or-
der of their decision. In the first hearing of United Mine Work-
ers of America v. Coronado Coal Co.,1° the owner of the coal
company sought damages from the union on the ground that the
strike from which he was suffering was part of a conspiracy to
eliminate non-union mines from the production of coal, and by
this means to insure the maintenance of the wage scales of union
members. In ruling against the employer the Supreme Court
found a lack of proof of a national conspiracy and found further
that the coal mined at this one property was not sufficient to
influence the price of coal nor to affect competition in its sale.
The case was then remanded.
In United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co.,
the union, in an effort to secure a closed shop with a number of
employers, engaged in a strike which involved both violence and
illegal picketing. The result was that the employers were unable
to fulfill their commitments to out-bf-state customers. The em-
ployers sought an injunction against the union alleging interfer-
ence with interstate commerce. In its decision the Supreme
Court found that there was no violation of the Act unless there
was a direct intent on the part of the union to restrain inter-
state commerce and to control prices and reduce competition.
The basis of the court's decision was that the result of the strike
was only incidentally to reduce or obstruct interstate commerce.
On the second hearing of the Coronado Case" the Supreme
Court was apparently convinced by the employers that it was
the purpose of the union so to restrain interstate commerce as
to affect the price of coal and that the production involved in
this case was sufficient to affect competition and price in inter-
'259 U. S. 344 (1922), on rehearing, 268 U. S. 295 (1925).
265 U. S. 457 (1924).
1"259 U. S. 344 (1922).
268 U. S. 295 (1925).
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol2/iss1/6
UNION SECURITY UNDER FEDERAL STATUTES
state commerce in coal. Therefore, the Court held that the strike
and the destruction of the mines was in violation of the Act.
From the foregoing cases, we may conclude that, up to this
point, it was the position of the Federal Courts that a nation-
wide, secondary boycott did violate the anti-trust statutes. A
second principle may be stated: That while a strike is not in
and of itself a violation of the statutes, a strike is a violation
where the intent is to prevent the competition of non-union
goods with union produced goods in interstate commerce.' 2
A further development in this trend of opinion is the deci-
sion in United States v. Brims.'3 In this case, the union (a car-
penters' local), the lumber mills and building contractors of
Chicago had entered into an agreement not to use lumber or mill-
work which had been produced by non-union labor. The Su-
preme Court found that the agreement was a violation of the
anti-trust acts because it acted to restrain interstate commerce
in non-union produced materials. 14 But, the holdings thus far
were to be greatly changed after the passage of the Federal
Anti-injunction Act in 1932.15 The turning point may be said to
have been marked by the decision in Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader.16 In this instance there was a sit-down strike, destruc-
tion of the company's property and prevention of the shipment
of a large stock of manufactured goods. The Company sued for
damages under the anti-trust acts. Mr. Justice Stone, in his
opinion, stated of the Sherman Act that "The end sought was
the prevention of restraints to free competition in business and
commercial transactions which tended to restrict production,
raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of
" There is another interesting decision involving the employer-employee
relationship, namely, Anderson v. Shipowners' Association of Pacific Coast,272 U. S. 359 (1926). This suit was brought by a merchant seaman seeking
to enjoin the employers' association from maintaining exclusive control of
the hiring of merchant seamen out of Pacific Coast ports. The Court held
that the control of all employment and the conditions of employment by
the Association was a combination in restraint of trade because the result
of their actions was to limit their own freedom in the carrying on of inter-
state and foreign commerce. Each employer, it seems, in the opinion of the
court should be free to do his own hiring and establish his own conditions
of employment and the wages to be paid.
272 U. S. 549 (1926).
"This principle was re-affirmed in Local 167 v. United States, 291 U. S.
293 (1934).
"47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 101 (1946), commonly known as the Norris-
La Guardia Act.
" 310 U. S. 469 (1940).
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purchasers or consumers of goods and services . . ." Thus, use
of violence and physical interference with the manufacture and
production of goods for interstate commerce was no longer to
be considered a violation of the anti-trust acts although they
might be offenses against other statutes so long as the strike did
not contravene the purposes set forth in the quotation given
above.
II.
The passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932, it is said,
was the result of the practice of granting injunctions in Federal
Courts which made the extension of union organization nearly
impossible. Upon a cursory reading, this Act will seem to be
only an extension of Section 20 of the Clayton Act. However,
there are two chief distinctions to be noted. In the first place
the definition of a labor dispute in the new Act includes conduct
in which the disputants need not stand to each other in the rela-
tion of employer and employee. The second important difference
is that whereas the Clayton Act had said that none of the activi-
ties listed in Section 20 was to be considered a violation of any
law of the United States, the Norris-LaGuardia Act contains no
such language and purports only to limit the granting of injunc-
tions by Federal Court.
The first and leading case under the Norris-LaGuardia Act
is United States v. Hutcheson.17 This case arose out of a dispute
between the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners and
the International Association of Machinists. The employer in
the case had awarded some construction work to the latter union
which the Carpenters claimed was theirs by right of-jurisdiction.
Members of both unions were employed by the company. The
Carpenters called a strike and circulated a bulletin, nationally,
to their members urging them to refrain from buying the product
of the struck employer. The United States brought an action
against the Carpenters alleging that the action of the union was
an unlawful restraint of trade. The Supreme Court dismissed
the action. The majority opinion dismissing the case was de-
livered by Justice Felix Frankfurter. In his opinion it appears
that the majority of the court concluded that the Norris-La-
Guardia Act was in effect an amendment of the Sherman and
1 312 U. S. 219 (1941).
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Clayton Anti-Trust Acts and that it made immune from prose-
cution thereunder all strikes, picketing, boycotts and other con-
certed union activities whose purposes were the protection of
the interest of the strikers, where such activities stemmed from
a labor dispute as defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The
opinion goes so far as to state that "so long as a union acts in
its self-interest and does not combine with non-rabor groups,
the licit and the illicit under Section 20 are not to be distin-
guished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom,
the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the
end of which particular union activities are the means.18 Thus,
so long as the activities of the union are not in concert with
employer groups, and are confined to protection of union in-
terests, the union is secure from prosecution under the anti-trust
acts. This general position was reaffirmed in the case of Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, I. B. E. W. 19 Here the union
had entered into a contract with a group of employers in New
York City to exclude the use of materials not made in the city.
The Supreme Court found this to be a violation of the anti-trust
acts. But, very significantly, in modifying the injunction granted
by the district court, the Supreme Court said that the restraining
order must be modified "to enjoin only those prohibited activities
in which the union engaged in combination 'with any person,
firm or corporation which is a non-labor group.'" In its remand
the Court stated that the order restraining the union must be so
framed as to permit the union to refuse to work on goods not
manufactured in the city; even though prohibited from doing so
by agreement with an employer.
A further insulation of unions against prosecution for viola-
tion of the anti-trust acts is found in the case of United Brother-
hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. United States.20
This case is sometimes referred to as the Lumber Products Case.
Here the combination of unions and employers was similar to
that in the Allen Bradley case, and the Supreme Court found
the parties in violation of the anti-trust acts. Of chief interest,
however, are the findings of the court that (1) the contract was
a violation of the anti-trust acts, (2) the provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act are applicable, (3) the union is relieved of lia-
18Id. at p. 232.
"325 U. S. 797 (1945).
'p313 U. S. 539 (1947).
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bility in cases of a labor dispute, and (4) the trial court erred
in charging that the agents of the union in negotiating the con-
tract, involved the local and national unions of which they were
the agents, merely because the agents had acted within the scope
of their authority. The Supreme Court held that as a prerequisite
to finding the local and national unions guilty, it would be neces-
sary to find that they had either directly participated in the
negotiations, or had authorized or ratified the acts of their agents.
The Supreme Court went still further in its extension of
protection to unions under Federal Statutes in Hunt v. Crum-
boch.2 1 In this case the union refused to permit its members to
work for the employer and, further, attempted to persuade
customers of the employer to cease doing business with him.
The end result of the process was to force the employer out of
business. The employer brought suit for violation of the anti-
trust acts. In its decision the Supreme Court said: "It is not a
violation of the Sherman Act for laborers in combination to
refuse to work. They can sell or not sell their labors as they
please, and upon such terms and conditions as they choose, with-
out infringing the anti-trust laws ... A worker is privileged un-
der congressional enactments, acting either alone or in concert
with his fellow workers, to associate or to decline to associate
with other workers, to accept, refuse to accept, or to terminate
a relation of employment, and his labor is not to be treated as
a 'commodity or article of Commerce.'" In this case, the effect
of the decision was to uphold the union's actions even to the
extent of forcing the employer out of business.
CONCLUSION.
In summary-it may be said that protection against prosecu-
tion under the anti-trust acts is extended to a union whenever
(1) the union acts in protection of its own interests; (2) acts
without combination with employers; (3) does not authorize the
illegal acts of its agents officially and (4) is engaged in a labor
dispute as defined by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Whenever these
circumstances exist the union is secure against a finding that
it is in violation of the anti-trust acts.2 2
325 U. S. 821 (1945) Hunt.
Further discussion of the immunities and security of unions under the
Federal Statutes not considered herein will follow.
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